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In early 2013, the Supreme Court released its much-anticipated deci-
sion in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A.1 The Court upheld the Quebec 
Civil Code’s exclusion of “de facto spouses”2 from provisions relating to 
spousal support and property division. A. produced four opinions3 and 
three lines of dissent. The Court disagreed about the required elements of 
discrimination; whether Quebec could assume that couples who simply 
cohabit have chosen to avoid statutory obligations; and whether spousal 
support and property provisions are functionally equivalent in terms of 
equality review.  
                                                                                                             
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Ottawa. I am grateful to Sonia Lawrence and 
to an anonymous reviewer for comments. With thanks to Eric McGill for superb research assistance. 
1 [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 191 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “A.”].  
2 In Quebec, the term “de facto spouses” refers to couples who cohabit who have neither 
married nor entered into a civil union. See Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64. 
3 Writing for four justices, LeBel J. found that the provisions did not prima facie 
discriminate and thus, dismissed the claim. Writing for five justices, Abella J. found a prima facie 
violation, but was alone in concluding that the impugned provisions also failed under s. 1. Chief 
Justice McLachlin found all of the provisions justified; and Deschamps J. (for three judges) found 
them justified except for the provisions excluding de facto spouses from spousal support. Some 
scholars have argued that McLachlin C.J.C.’s decision is so at odds with Abella J.’s that it ought not 
to be counted as part of a “majority”. See Hester Lessard, “Narrative Strategies of Smoke and 
Mirrors vs Dramatic Struggles” (May 8, 2013), online: The Insitute for Feminist Legal Studies at 
Osgoode <http://ifls.osgoode.yorku.ca/2013/05/eric-lola-2-hester-lessard-narrative-strategies-of-smoke- 
mirrors-vs-dramatic-struggles/>. For the purposes of this paper, I take the Chief Justice’s reasons at 
face value. 
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It is practically impossible to imagine constitutional law without 
dissent.4 The very first opinion in the Charter5 era — the Patriation 
Reference6 — was marked by it.7 Dissent is powerful and evocative, even 
mythic; it suggests roads not taken and parallel universes. It evokes a 
fundamental and, sometimes, unsettling contingency about law. It can be 
problematic,8 disrupting easy understandings of how to a court “gets it 
right” and, thus, damaging to a court’s legitimacy. 9  
Yet, dissent has positive aspects, too. It can: better articulate norms 
and understandings underlying key decision-rules;10 provide a counter-
narrative to prevailing orthodoxy;11 lay the foundation for future devel-
opment of law;12 provide a necessary outlet for disagreement that 
otherwise might constrain and frustrate judicial actors; and even secure 
                                                                                                             
4 Throughout this paper, “dissent” and “judicial disagreement” are used interchangeably. 
“Dissent” can refer, narrowly, to a departure from the majority in both reasoning and result (for 
example, McLachlin J.’s dissents in R. v. Keegstra, [1996] S.C.J. No. 21, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 458 
(S.C.C.) and Taylor v. Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 
892 (S.C.C.)). It also can be used more broadly to include a departure with respect to the reasoning 
but not the result (for example, Sopinka J. in R. v. Jobidon, [1991] S.C.J. No. 65, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 
714 (S.C.C.)), or a departure with respect to the result but not the reasoning (for example, Fish J. in 
R. v. Ryan, [2013] S.C.J. No. 3, 353 D.L.R. (4th) 387 (S.C.C.)). Some refer to dissents in the latter 
category as concurrences.  
5 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter’]. While my focus here 
is constitutional adjudication, the functions performed by dissent are not limited to that arena.  
6 Reference re Amendment to the Canadian Constitution, [1982] S.C.J. No. 100, [1982] 
2 S.C.R. 791 (S.C.C.).  
7 Carissima Mathen, “The Patriation Reference as Constitutional Method” (2011) 
54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 143. 
8 Early in her tenure, McLachlin C.J.C. expressed a preference for unanimity. Emmett 
Macfarlane, “Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 52 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
379, at 384. 
9 I have argued elsewhere that dissenting opinions are not necessarily detrimental to 
authority. Carissima Mathen, “Dissent and Judicial Authority in Charter Cases” (2003) 
52 U.N.B.L.J. 321. Briefly, judicial decisions are authoritative (meaning, they pre-empt the reasons 
one might otherwise have for action) because of their form, buttressed by the court’s duty to give 
reasons explaining the outcome. On this view, dissents are not fatal to authority, since authority does 
not depend on the particular reasons that a court adopts. Authority depends instead on the process 
and form by which the reasons are produced. 
10 R. v. Cinous, [2002] S.C.J. No. 28, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
11 Chief Justice Dickson in R. v. Bernard, [1988] S.C.J. No. 66, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 
833 (S.C.C.). 
12 Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, “The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?” (2000) 
38 Osgoode Hall L.J. 495; Anita S. Krishnakumar, “On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent” 
(2000) 52 Rutgers L.R. 781; Richard A. Primus, “Canon, AntiCanon, and Judicial Dissent” (1998) 
48 Duke L.J. 243.  
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broader acceptance of a majority decision by showing that it is a product 
of deliberation.13  
In this paper, I present another possible “upside” to dissent, that 
focuses on the issue in A.: equality. First, I canvass two ways that dissent 
manifests in Charter jurisprudence: one (functional) relating to the 
judiciary’s appropriate role in constitutional disputes; and the other 
(principled) relating to the identification, scope or application of rules 
and norms. The two models are richly represented in equality 
jurisprudence. In the Supreme Court’s first section 15 case, Andrews v. 
Law Society of British Columbia,14 the Court divided over the functional 
question of how closely the Court should scrutinize legislated difference. 
In subsequent cases, the Court has struggled to reach consensus on the 
meaning of equality itself — an issue of principle.  
The fact that equality jurisprudence has been characterized by chronic 
disagreement might appear unfortunate. But my review of section 15 case 
law suggests that, by providing the space to fully flesh out points of 
disagreement, dissent has contributed to richer accounts of equality. 
Borrowing the language of Cass Sunstein, I suggest that a divided 
equality decision that is the result of failure to reach agreement on “deep” 
issues is preferable to one that, as the price of unanimity, remains 
“shallow”.15 I conclude that the decision in A. is deep rather than shallow 
and so, despite its frustrating divisions, it is on the whole better than many 
of the unanimous equality decisions that preceded it.16  
II. TWO MODELS OF DISAGREEMENT 
Judges disagree about everything. They dispute the assessment of 
particular facts,17 the sufficiency of evidence,18 and how to analyze a 
                                                                                                             
13 On this theory, dissents are illustrative of a quasi-democratic function in which appellate 
courts mirror the processes of other deliberative bodies. Kevin Stack, “The Practice of Dissent in the 
Supreme Court” (1996) 105:8 Yale L.J. 2235, at 2246. 
14 [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”]. 
15 Cass Sunstein, “The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Leaving Things Undecided” (1996-1997) 
110 Harv. L. Rev. 4 [hereinafter “Sunstein”]. I explain my preference for “deep” versus “shallow” 
decisions in Part III.3. 
16 My debt to Sunstein is more conceptual than substantive. Sunstein argues that “[a]t least 
most of the time, constitutional law is narrower, shallower, more incremental, and based on 
analogies” and it is clear from his work that he thinks that this is, on balance, the right approach. So 
he would not advocate for “deep” equality decisions. I will address this point in the final section. Id., 
at n 26. 
17 R. v. Thibert, [1996] S.C.J. No. 2, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 37 (S.C.C.). 
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body of precedent.19 They take issue with the framing of legal ques-
tions.20 They dispute the principles at stake in a given situation. They 
even contest what courts are or should be doing when they decide cases. 
Why do judges disagree so pointedly, and on such a wide range of 
issues? One possible answer is the nature of deliberation in a common law 
system. Reasoning by analogy, demonstrating that a decision is either 
compatible with previous case law or articulating careful reasons why it 
need not be, considering the various arguments presented — these tasks 
represent complicated exercises of judgment, analysis and discretion. 
When such tasks are performed by different individuals, all operating from 
a position of relative equality,21 it is not surprising that results will vary.  
A second possible answer derives from the nature of constitutional 
interpretation. In Canada, courts have eschewed originalism22 and other 
intent-based understandings of constitutional meaning. Taking their cue 
from the Supreme Court, most judges take a decidedly relaxed perspec-
tive to in limine issues such as standing,23 and mootness;24 and they 
jealously guard their role in identifying, and even generating, constitu-
tional norms.25 Given these starting points, it is not surprising that judges 
find themselves on different sides of a legal issue. Indeed, it is perhaps a 
minor miracle that they agree as much as they do. 
The context just described generates its own special brand of dis-
agreement. I call this functional disagreement, because it is about the 
framework that ought to govern judicial review itself.26 It has been 
                                                                                                             
18 R. v. Pappajohn, [1980] S.C.J. No. 51, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120 (S.C.C.). 
19 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 (S.C.C.).  
20 R. v. A. (J.), [2011] S.C.J. No. 28, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 440 (S.C.C.).  
21 By this I mean that no single person’s opinion is presumptively privileged (for example, 
if the person previously has written on the same subject, or has seniority); that all members are 
permitted to express their views; and that no one is required to conform to others’ views. 
22 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1997); Edwin Meese III, “Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent” 
(1988) 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 5. 
23 Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence 
Society, [2012] S.C.J. No. 45, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524 (S.C.C.).  
24 New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), [1999] S.C.J. 
No. 47, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (S.C.C.).  
25 This is referred to as the purposive approach: R. v. Therens, [1985] S.C.J. No. 30, [1985] 
1 S.C.R. 613 (S.C.C.); R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Big M”].  
26 For example, judges may disagree about whether to adapt a generally “passive” or 
“active” orientation. Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar 
of Politics, 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). Drawing in part on a Bickelian view, 
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prominent since 1982, and one of its best examples is the aftermath of 
the decision in Reference re Motor Vehicle Act.27  
The Motor Vehicle Reference was the Supreme Court’s first opportu-
nity to squarely address section 7 of the Charter. From the outset, the 
provision had generated anxiety. An oft-cited concern was that the Court 
might interpret section 7’s special qualifying term, “fundamental justice”, 
so as to mirror the experience of the U.S. During the so-called Lochner 
era, that country’s Supreme Court used an expanded understanding of 
“due process” to strike down laws meant to promote social welfare.28 
Lochner itself now is discredited, and identified with the worst excesses 
of judicial power.  
In the Motor Vehicle Reference, the Supreme Court acknowledged but 
dismissed the concern that an assertive approach to section 7 would 
transform the Court into a judicial “super legislature”.29 It pointed out that 
“the historic decision to entrench the Charter” was political, and thus, 
“[a]djudication under the Charter must be approached free of any lingering 
doubts as to its legitimacy”.30 Resisting the idea that Canada should allow 
“the American debate to define the issue”,31 the Court decided that the 
Charter’s distinctiveness required a purposive interpretative approach.32 
                                                                                                             
Sunstein advocates the passive approach: “saying no more than is necessary to justify an outcome, 
and leaving as much as possible undecided” on the basis that it reduces the incidents and effects of 
mistakes and that it contributes to democracy by ensuring that courts do not pre-empt further 
discussion — and possibly, resolution — of situations giving rise to social conflict. Sunstein, supra, 
note 15, at 6. Obviously, there is a great deal that can be said about what constitutes a judicial 
mistake, as well as what its costs might be. In the U.S. context, one case often cited in this regard is 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (where the Supreme Court ruled that African-Americans 
were not “citizens” under the U.S. Constitution and struck down the Missouri Compromise). In the 
Canadian context, one might point to Bliss v. Canada (Attorney General), [1978] S.C.J. No. 81, 
[1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 (S.C.C.) (where the Supreme Court ruled that pregnancy-based distinctions do 
not deny equality before the law on the basis of sex). 
27 Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 486 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Reference”]. While the opinion was contained in a 
reference, this did not factor into the Court’s assessment of the appropriate scope of judicial review. 
For a discussion of the differences between advisory opinions and cases, see C. Mathen, “Mutability 
and Method in the Marriage Reference” (2005) 54 U.N.B.L.J. 43. 
28 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) [hereinafter “Lochner”].  
29 Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 27, at para. 16. 
30 Id. 
31 Id., at para. 18. 
32 Id., at para. 21. The Court decided that the principles of fundamental justice are reflective 
of the “basic tenets of the legal system”, one of which is that no one should be found guilty of a 
criminal offence if he or she is “morally innocent” which requires some proof of fault.  
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The assertive nature of the Motor Vehicle Reference was all the more 
striking because of its unanimity.33 No judge dissented from the idea that 
section 7 — and indeed the Charter itself — signalled a new era in judicial 
review subjecting legislation to greater and more in-depth scrutiny. 
The unanimity, though, was short-lived. Just two years later, in R. v. 
Vaillancourt, the Court divided on how section 7 applied to the offence of 
murder in a case challenging what was sometimes called the “felony 
murder rule”.34  
The Motor Vehicle Reference had already determined the substantive 
potential of section 7. Yet, in the subsequent case of Vaillancourt, the 
Court avoided what would have been the most obvious extension: a rule 
that all criminal offences require a fully subjective mens rea.35 Noting 
that many criminal laws do not use subjective fault, Lamer J. elected not 
to throw all of them into jeopardy.36 Instead, he articulated a narrower 
principle: some crimes carry such intense “stigma” and/or penalties that 
conviction without proof of subjective fault is unfair.37 The stigma of 
murder, he mused, is sufficiently severe to require proof that the accused 
actually foresaw that death was likely to result from his or her action. 
But Lamer J. found it unnecessary to make the foregoing a holding of 
the case because, he concluded, the existing rule did not require even 
objective foresight of death.38  
                                                                                                             
33 The Motor Vehicle Reference was heard by a panel of seven. There were two concurring 
opinions. Interestingly, in light of his subsequent and numerous dissents, McIntyre J. wrote a brief 
concurring opinion but basically agreed with Lamer J. Justice Wilson wrote a longer opinion arguing 
for a different approach to s. 1 (that violations of s. 7 could never be reasonable limits), 
foreshadowing her even more rigorous approach to Charter rights. 
34 R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 83, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Vaillancourt”]; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, ss. 21(2), 213(d). The term is borrowed from 
the U.S., as Canada no longer classifies serious crimes as “felonies”. Vaillancourt engaged in armed 
robbery with an accomplice who killed someone using a firearm that the defendant had believed was 
unloaded. Under a combination of the felony-murder rule and party liability, because the accomplice 
was vulnerable to a second degree murder charge, so was Vaillancourt. 
35 The case originally was heard before nine judges but one, Chouinard J., took no part in 
the judgment. It was decided on the merits, 7-1. 
36 Vaillancourt, id., at para. 27 (emphasis in original). 
37 Id., at para. 28. 
38 Id.: 
I am presently of the view that it is a principle of fundamental justice that a conviction for 
murder cannot rest on anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of subjective 
foresight. … I need not and will not rest my finding that s. 213(d) violates the Charter on 
this view, because s. 213(d) does not … even meet the lower threshold test of objective 
foreseeability. 
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Justices Beetz and Le Dain agreed that the law violated the Charter 
but took issue with Lamer J.’s obiter statement about murder.39 In dis-
sent, McIntyre J. went further, stating that the “principal complaint” in 
the case was not whether the accused had committed a serious offence, 
but whether it should be called “murder”.40 He was dubious that section 7 
could have anything to say about the matter:  
[W]hile it may be illogical to characterize an unintentional killing as 
murder, no principle of fundamental justice is offended only because 
serious criminal conduct, involving the commission of a crime of 
violence resulting in the killing of a human being, is classified as 
murder and not in some other manner.41 
These judges believed that while the legislative judgment reflected in 
the felony murder rule is harsh, it was entirely Parliament’s to make. 
And, while McIntyre J. appeared to dissent on a matter of substantive 
law, he clearly drew on functional concerns: the Court should not usurp 
the legislature’s prerogative to declare certain behaviour wrongful. 
A few years later, in R. v. Martineau,42 the Court confirmed subjec-
tive foresight of death as the minimum fault requirement for murder. 
Lamer, now Chief Justice, gave full effect to the principle he previously 
had hinted at. But Martineau, too, was divided. Justice McIntyre’s mantle 
was taken up by L’Heureux-Dubé J., who expressed grave doubts that 
stigma is an appropriate consideration of fundamental justice.43 For his 
                                                                                                             
39 “I do not find it necessary to decide whether there exists a principle of fundamental justice 
that a conviction for murder cannot rest on anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of 
subjective foresight.” Id., per Beetz J., at para. 45. 
40 Id., at para. 51. 
41 Id., at para. 51, citing R. v. Munro, [1983] O.J. No. 144 , 8 C.C.C. (3d) 260, at 293 (Ont. 
C.A.). Justice McIntyre also disagreed with the Chief Justice’s analysis of s. 213 itself, arguing that it 
was not possible for someone to be convicted despite a reasonable doubt about whether death was 
objectively foreseeable. Id., at para. 49. 
42 [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633 (S.C.C.). The case considered a different 
subsection of constructive murder: s. 213(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. 
43 Id., at 665.: 
Those who are critical of all forms of the “felony-murder” rule base their denunciation on 
the premise that mens rea is the exclusive determinant of the level of “stigma” that is 
properly applied to an offender. This appears to me to confuse some very fundamental 
principles of criminal law and ignores the pivotal contribution of actus reus to the defini-
tion and appropriate response to proscribed criminal offences. If both components, actus 
reus as well as mens rea, are not considered when assessing the level of fault attributable 
to an offender, we would see manslaughter and assault causing bodily harm as no more 
worthy of condemnation than an assault. Mere attempts would become as serious as 
full offences. The whole correlation between the consequences of a criminal act and its 
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part, Sopinka J. found no need to consider a general principle. Drawing a 
link between interpreting common and constitutional law,44 he argued for 
restraint in both, noting that an issue should not be decided unless it is 
necessary to the resolution of a case, or there is some other “overriding 
reason”.45 
Thus, in the murder cases, after an initially united front, the Court 
split on the implications of the expanded approach to section 7. The dis-
sents in Vaillancourt and Martineau presaged a Court that has never 
achieved sustained unity on the intersection between fundamental justice 
and culpable homicide.46  
In contrast to functional disagreement stands disagreement based on 
principle. My use of “principle” here is based loosely on Ronald 
Dworkin’s account of legal interpretation.47 In Law’s Empire, Dworkin 
argued that law best claims legitimacy — justifying its coercive aspects48 
— when as a process it seeks “integrity”.49 Integrity is achieved through 
identifying and applying principles that provide the best interpretation of 
a community’s legal practice.50 Famously, Dworkin used “an imaginary 
judge of superhuman, intellectual power and patience”51 to demonstrate 
the interpretative manifestation of integrity. The judge, “Hercules”, does 
not shrink from cases involving questions of political morality; instead, 
he accepts that judges must make “decisions that give voice as well as 
effect to convictions about morality that are widespread throughout the 
                                                                                                             
retributive repercussions would become obscured by a stringent and exclusive examina-
tion of the accused’s own asserted intentions. 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé also disagreed, in any event, that s. 213(a) permitted convictions in the 
absence of objective foresight of death. 
44 Id., at 682:  
Overbroad statements of principle are inimical to the tradition of incremental develop-
ment of the common law. Likewise, the development of law under the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms is best served by deciding cases before the courts, not by antici-
pating the results of future cases. 
45 Id., at 684. 
46 R. v. Logan, [1990] S.C.J. No. 89, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 731 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Creighton, 
[1993] S.C.J. No. 91, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.), where Lamer C.J.C. narrowly lost a battle to 
entrench objective foresight of death as the minimum requirement for culpable homicide other than 
murder. 
47 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1986) [hereinafter 
“Dworkin”]. 
48 Id., at 191. 
49 Id., c. 6. 
50 Id., at 95-96. 
51 Id., at 225. 
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community”.52 This means that all courts have the power to decide “what 
the Constitution means and to declare acts of other departments of 
government invalid if they exceed the powers provided for them by the 
Constitution”.53 
Though Dworkin’s account has been criticized on both analytic and 
normative grounds,54 it is a reasonable description of what many 
Canadian judges appear to be doing. The Charter narrative involves 
judges searching for greater meaning, going beyond purely textual 
analysis, and seeking to situate particular disputes within a historical and 
political framework. In the Motor Vehicle Reference, for example, the 
Supreme Court stated that section 7 entrenches principles, which reflect a 
particular criminal law tradition and heritage. These principles, the Court 
noted, “do not lie in the realm of general public policy but in the inherent 
domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice system”.55 The Court 
thus asserted a unique competence to identify those principles. The 
confident stance was echoed in other Charter cases, including Big M 
(articulating a broad and expansive understanding of the elements of a free 
and democratic society);56 Hunter v. Southam (adopting the purposive 
approach to Charter interpretation);57 and Oakes (incorporating balancing 
into section 1).58  
A prime example of principle-based disagreement is found in 
R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd.59 There, an Ontario law required the 
retail industry to observe Sunday as a common pause day but permitted 
some smaller establishments to instead close on Saturdays. In an earlier 
case, Big M, the Court had struck down the federal Lord’s Day Act60 
because of its clear religious orientation. Unlike Big M, the law in 
Edwards Books was not obviously religious, but it was held to 
indirectly violate the freedom of religion of Saturday observers who 
                                                                                                             
52 Id., at 248. 
53 Id., at 356.  
54 H.L.A. Hart, “Postscript”, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Larry 
Alexander, “Striking Back at the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin’s Theory of Law” 
(1987) Law & Phil. 6, at 419; Brian Leiter, “Beyond the Hart-Dworkin Debate: The Methodology 
Problem in Jurisprudence” (2003) 48 Am. J. Juris., at 17-51; John Mackie, “The Third Theory of 
Law” in M. Cohen, ed., Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence (London: Duckworth, 
1983).  
55 Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 27, at 503. 
56 Big M, supra, note 25. 
57 Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). 
58 R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.).  
59 [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edwards Books”].  
60 R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13, s. 4, struck down in Big M, supra, note 25. 
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could not avail themselves of the exemption.61 The case, then, largely 
turned on a section 1 analysis.  
Writing for three judges, Dickson C.J.C. found the law to be a 
reasonable compromise between accommodating religious beliefs and 
securing the benefits of a common pause day.62 For him, the case turned 
on the narrow issue of whether the scheme was a reasonable limit on 
those Saturday observers who were required to work. Relying on the 
particular characteristics of the retail industry,63 Dickson C.J.C. held that 
the legislature need not always choose the least impairing choice but can 
select one of several reasonable alternatives.64  
Justice Wilson, dissenting, explicitly invoked the notion of law as 
integrity and referenced Dworkin’s use of “checkerboard” laws. These 
are laws which treat people differently based on considerations that are 
clearly arbitrary — figuratively, whether they occupy a red or black 
square. For example, the legislature might dispense abortion rights to 
women based on the year of their birth, or forbid racial discrimination 
only in certain places, such as in movie theatres but not in playgrounds.65 
One might think that people on opposing sides of political disputes 
would favour these kinds of compromises over an outright loss. But, 
Dworkin argued, reasonably, that no one would be satisfied with such a 
solution. To him, this fact revealed a fundamental point about our 
                                                                                                             
61 The majority that found a prima facie infringement consisted of Dickson C.J.C., 
Chouinard, Le Dain and Wilson JJ. While La Forest J. accepted the Chief Justice’s s. 2(a) analysis, 
he was concerned that recognizing prima facie infringement where there is only an indirect 
interference with religious freedom would put at risk too many laws. Edwards Books, supra, note 59, 
at paras. 177, 187, 190.  
62 Id., at para. 119. 
63 Id., at para. 128. These characteristics — including intense competitiveness among 
merchants; low unionization rates; and high proportion of female employees — made it particularly 
“vulnerable to subtle and overt pressure from its employers”.  
64 Id., at para. 141. In explanation, Dickson C.J.C. said the following, at para. 136: 
The economic position of [retail] employees affords them few choices in respect of 
their conditions of employment. It would ignore the realities faced by these workers 
to suggest that they stand up to their employer or seek a job elsewhere if they wish to 
enjoy a common day of rest with their families and friends. ... In interpreting and ap-
plying the Charter. I believe that the courts must be cautious to ensure that it does 
not simply become an instrument of better situated individuals to roll back legislation 
which has as its object the improvement of the condition of less advantaged persons. 
… I cannot fault the Legislature for determining that the protection of the employees 
ought to prevail. 
65 Dworkin, supra, note 47, at 178. 
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conception of law — that it rejects internal compromises.66 Justice Wilson 
drew on this, describing the Ontario law as trying to “effect a compromise 
between the government’s objective of a common pause day and the 
freedom of religion of those who close on Saturdays for religious reasons”. 
67 That compromise undermined the law’s stated purpose of ensuring 
respect for religious difference.  
The point here is not that one opinion is more principled, or faithful, 
to Dworkin’s framework. Chief Justice Dickson’s reasons are consistent 
with an integrity-driven approach. Just like Wilson J., he wrestles with 
larger questions of consistency, fairness and equality. Yet, the opinions 
remain diametrically opposed, revealing fault lines in what are otherwise 
compatible approaches to constitutional interpretation.68 
The line between functional and principled disagreement is not al-
ways a sharp one. For example, functional disagreement can rest on 
divergent principles about institutional competence and the separation of 
powers. The line between the two arguably becomes even fuzzier in the 
Charter context, where no right is absolute.69 The interpretation of  
section 1 presents opportunities for division along both models of dis-
agreement. So, I do not claim that functional and principle-based 
disagreement occupy purely separate categories — only that they repre-
sent a reasonable taxonomy of how judicial disagreement manifests in 
Charter jurisprudence. That taxonomy is useful for analyzing dissent in 
equality law, to which I turn next. 
                                                                                                             
66 Id., at 179: “If there must be compromise because people are divided about justice … it 
must be compromise about which scheme of justice to adopt rather than a compromised scheme of 
justice.” 
67 Edwards Books, supra, note 59, at para. 208. 
68 The fault lines appear in other cases such as R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.J. No. 1, 
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.) where, although both justices thought that the then-abortion law was 
unconstitutional, Dickson J. employed a narrow analytic approach focusing on arbitrariness and 
“illusory defences”, while Wilson J. tackled the question of whether terminating a pregnancy is itself 
protected by the Charter. I discuss Dickson J.’s approach in “Rational Connections: Oakes, Section 1 
and the Charter’s Legal Rights” Ottawa Law Review (forthcoming). 
69 Alan Gewirth, “Are There Any Absolute Rights?” in Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories of 
Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984) 91.  
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III. DISSENT AND EQUALITY 
1. Divided from the Start 
Consistent with the Chief Justice’s description of it as “the most 
difficult right”,70 section 15 of the Charter has generated much judicial 
disagreement. The A. decision joins numerous cases71 using equality 
principles to recognize alternative family forms as equally worthy of 
respect and consideration. Yet, the Court has struggled over less direct 
claims of discrimination in family law, particularly when individuals 
within relationships have different needs and goals, or when one person 
relies on a prior choice to be legally un-tethered while the other seeks 
support.72  
A conventional reading of section 15 might take the merit of judicial 
consensus at face value, perhaps drawing on concerns over institutional 
legitimacy or certainty. The reading probably would begin with the deci-
sion in Andrews which endorsed substantive equality. It certainly would 
highlight the dramatic 1995 split over so-called “functional relevance”.73 
                                                                                                             
70 The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, P.C., “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” 
(2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 17. 
71 Consider the path from Canada (Attorney General) v. Mossop, [1993] S.C.J. No. 20, 
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 554 (S.C.C.) (absent a constitutional challenge, error of law to include a same-sex 
relationship within the prohibited ground of discrimination of “family status”) to Egan v. Canada, 
[1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Egan”] (heterosexual definition of 
“spouse” in federal benefits scheme is justified violation of s. 15) and Miron v. Trudel, [1995] S.C.J. 
No. 44, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Miron”] (excluding common law couples from 
standard form insurance benefits available to “spouses” is unjustified violation of s. 15) to M. v. H., 
[1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (excluding same-sex spouses from family law 
regime is unjustified violation of s. 15) to Halpern v. Toronto (City), [2003] O.J. No. 2268, 65 O.R. 
(3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.) (definition of “marriage” must include same-sex couples).  
72 Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, [2002] S.C.J. No. 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Walsh”] and Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development), 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 60, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 357 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hodge”]. Walsh was particularly 
relevant to the A. decision as it involved an equality challenge to a common law regime which 
denied property rights to unmarried couples. A majority of the Supreme Court found that the law did 
not discriminate in a prima facie sense. In A. the trial court and Quebec Court of Appeal felt bound 
by Walsh with respect to Quebec’s treatment of property rights. Justice LeBel found that Walsh was 
consistent with the Court’s general approach to discrimination and did not need to be distinguished 
or additionally supported. Justice Abella found that Walsh had been overtaken by subsequent 
jurisprudence and was no longer good law. In their respective opinions, the Chief Justice and 
Deschamps J. agreed. Given space restrictions, I cannot discuss the disagreement between LeBel and 
Abella JJ. in depth, although I do allude to it, infra note 155 and surrounding text. 
73 Egan, supra, note 71; Miron, supra, note 71.  
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That split might be seen as being “repaired” by the 1999 Law74 case. The 
resulting equality framework created a backlash to which the Court re-
sponded a decade later, again unanimously, in Kapp75 and in Withler.76 
The reading likely would end with dismay because, in A., all consensus 
appears to have vanished.  
My reading also begins with Andrews but is very different.77 Andrews 
achieved critically important unity on several interpretative issues: the 
rejection of the similarly situated approach; the recognition that, some-
times, equality may require differential treatment and the concomitant 
need to show “discrimination”; the assertion that section 15 has a strong 
remedial component; and the idea that the enumerated grounds are not a 
closed list. Subsequent cases appeared to cement the expansive approach, 
confirming that discrimination must be analyzed from the perspective of 
the right-claimant78 and need not be intentional;79 and that differential 
treatment need not be tied to biologically immutable characteristics.80 
In Andrews, the Court recognized that equality has formal and sub-
stantive aspects. Formal equality requires that similar cases be treated 
according to similar principles; it incorporates the rule of law command 
against arbitrary treatment and is indispensable to a just society. Substan-
tive equality requires consideration of the broader social context in which 
people live and, therefore, cannot be attained merely by treating people 
similarly to those who appear to be “like” them.81 More is required, 
namely, consideration to “the content of the law, to its purpose, and its 
impact upon those to whom it applies, and also upon those whom it ex-
cludes from its application”.82 
                                                                                                             
74 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 
1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”].  
75 R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”].  
76 Withler v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Withler”].  
77 Supra, note 14. The case arose as a challenge to a citizenship requirement for entry into the 
legal profession. 
78 Id.; Law, supra, note 74. 
79 Andrews, id. 
80 Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] S.C.J. No. 24, 
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 203 (S.C.C.).  
81 Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 42, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219 (S.C.C.).  
82 Andrews, supra, note 14, at 169. See also Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 
S.C.J. No. 81, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 872 (S.C.C.), holding that differential treatment based on sex does not 
necessarily violate s. 15. In this case, a male prison inmate argued that the fact that female guards could 
frisk him constituted discrimination given that female inmates were not subjected to cross-gender frisks. 
Recognizing that women’s vulnerability to male sexual violence poses a distinctive concern not met in 
the converse situation, La Forest J. held that the policy’s facial inequality did not discriminate.  
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Clearly, Andrews was a milestone. Yet, the seeds of dissent already 
had been sown. For one thing, Andrews itself is a Janus-type83 decision. 
Justice McIntyre, who authored the important equality analysis, did not 
think that limiting bar admission to Canadian citizens was unconstitu-
tional.84 Noting that “distinctions are one of the main preoccupations of 
legislatures”,85 McIntyre J. cautioned that aggressive section 15 review 
would threaten myriad laws and regulations. His concern, which was 
explicitly functional,86 cashed out in a more flexible approach to section 
1 so as not to “deny the community-at-large the benefits associated with 
sound social and economic legislation”.87 Because section 15 is “the 
broadest of all guarantees” which “applies to and supports all other 
rights”, and because the state has “a right and a duty to make laws for the 
whole community”, McIntyre J. continued, “it will rarely be possible to 
say of any legislative distinction that it is clearly the right legislative 
choice or that it is clearly a wrong one”.88  
Arguably, in Andrews the “best” answer was not obvious. Noting the 
important influence that lawyers play in our society and legal system, 
and the fact that citizenship itself is generally attainable for those living 
here, McIntyre J. said that the Court should not simply replace the legis-
lature’s opinion with its own.89 He made no conclusions about the 
desirability of the actual policy, unlike the members of the majority who 
associated it with historical suspicion of non-citizens. His point was that 
the Court should tread lightly before terming any law “unreasonable”.  
                                                                                                             
83 Janus is the Roman god of beginnings and of transition. He is portrayed as having two 
faces, one turned toward the past and the other toward the future. I invoke him here for the more 
classic connotation of oppositional characteristics. But the image of Janus is also strikingly apt for 
Andrews which is, itself, both an ending and an origin point for equality law post-1982. 
84 Justice Lamer joined McIntyre J.’s opinion in full. 
85 Andrews, supra, note 14, at 168. 
86 In a concurring opinion (that foreshadowed more profound disagreement), La Forest J. stated: 
[I]t was never intended in enacting s. 15 that it become a tool for the wholesale subjection 
to judicial scrutiny of variegated legislative choices in no way infringing on values fun-
damental to a free and democratic society. … Much economic and social policy-making 
is simply beyond the institutional competence of the courts: their role is to protect against 
incursions on fundamental values, not to second guess policy decisions.  
Note, though, that La Forest J. agreed with the majority that the citizenship requirement was not 
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Andrews, then, was hardly a unified decision.90 
By 1995, the Court’s lack of internal cohesion on section 15 had in-
tensified. In Egan v. Canada91 and in Miron v. Trudel,92 the Court split 
badly on the role of “functional relevance” in establishing discrimina-
tion.93 On the surface, the disagreement was about whether a prohibited 
ground of discrimination might nonetheless be an appropriate basis for 
legislating different treatment in some circumstances. But the true dis-
agreement was about whether certain personal characteristics previously 
viewed as foundational to the family unit had continuing significance for 
state policy. Thus, the minority opinions94 in Egan and Miron insisted 
that it is open to the state to promote a family unit based on “biological 
realities” like procreation.95  
A majority of the Court did not agree.96 But that was not enough to 
vindicate the equality claims. Section 1 still provides the possibility of 
                                                                                                             
90 The case was heard before seven judges but one, Le Dain J. did not participate. Justice 
McIntyre’s analysis was accepted by six justices (with a concurring opinion by La Forest J. cited 
above); his s. 1 analysis carried only two; and Wilson J.’s analysis of s. 1, deciding the outcome, 
commanded four. 
91 Egan, supra, note 71. Egan challenged the opposite-sex definition of “spouse” set out in 
the Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. O-9, ss. 2, 19(1). 
92 Miron, supra, note 71. Miron challenged the exclusion of unmarried couples from 
standard-form insurance agreements prescribed by provincial law. 
93 Egan and Miron were decided together with Thibaudeau v. Canada, [1995] S.C.J. 
No. 42, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 (S.C.C.), another failed equality claim but one decided on a 
different basis. 
94 By “minority” I refer to the analysis of prima facie infringement. The Court reached 
differing conclusions on outcome, finding the law constitutional in Egan, and invalid in Miron. 
95 Egan, supra, note 71, per La Forest J., at 515: 
[M]arriage has from time immemorial been firmly grounded in our legal tradition, one 
that is itself a reflection of long-standing philosophical and religious traditions. But its ul-
timate raison d’être transcends all of these and is firmly anchored in the biological and 
social realities that heterosexual couples have the unique ability to procreate, that most 
children are the product of these relationships, and that they are generally cared for and 
nurtured by those who live in that relationship. In this sense, marriage is by nature heter-
osexual. It would be possible to legally define marriage to include homosexual couples, 
but this would not change the biological and social realities that underlie the traditional 
marriage. 
96 Miron, supra, note 71, at para. 56: 
The danger of using relevance … is acute when one is dealing with so-called “biological” 
differences ... If we are not to undermine the promise of equality in s. 15(1) of the Charter, 
we must go beyond biological differences and examine the impact of the impugned 
distinction in its social and economic context to determine whether it, in fact, perpetuates 
the undesirable stereotyping which s. 15(1) aims to eradicate.  
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé concurred in the finding of discrimination, but wrote concurring reasons 
urging that any template for equality analysis, focusing for instance on prohibited grounds, be 
abandoned in favour of a purely contextual approach. 
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saving the legislation as a reasonable limit. This occurred in Egan, where 
Sopinka J. agreed with four judges that the law was discriminatory but, 
drawing on functional concerns, upheld it. Citing the need for “flexibility 
in extending social benefits”, he cautioned that aggressive judicial review 
would make governments “reluctant” to act at all.97 Additionally, the leg-
islative history of survivor benefits showed an “evolving expansion of 
the definition of the intended recipients of the benefits”.98 Because the 
government was mediating between competing groups seeking scarce re-
sources, it was entitled to take an “incremental approach”99 to rights 
recognition.  
In 1999, the Court unanimously declared that its earlier (fractured) 
decisions nonetheless reflected a common understanding of section 15’s 
central purpose. In Law v. Canada,100 the promotion of essential human 
dignity became the new touchstone for discrimination. Dignity was de-
scribed as an individual or group’s feelings of self-respect and self-
worth,101 determined from the perspective of a “rational” person in simi-
lar circumstances.102 The Court identified four “contextual factors” to 
help determine whether a particular distinction constitutes discrimina-
tion.103 The repeated reference to the “reasonable person” appeared to 
make the lived experience of inequality less relevant to discrimination. 
Discrimination instead became firmly attached to the rational individual, 
able to look past a personal slight and evaluate a state law or policy 
within its larger context. This was borne out in later (unanimous) deci-
sions which dismissed equality claims because a “reasonable person” 
would not think that she had been subject to discrimination.104  
                                                                                                             
97 Egan, supra, note 71, at 572-73. 
98 Id., at 574. 
99 Id., at 575. 
100 Law, supra, note 74. 
101 Id., at paras. 51-53. 
102 Id., at para. 61. 
103 The contextual factors are: pre-existing disadvantage; the correspondence, or lack thereof, 
between the ground or grounds on which the claim is based and the claimant’s actual need, capacity, or 
circumstances; any ameliorative purpose or effects of the law upon a more disadvantaged person or 
group in society; and the nature and scope of the individual interest at stake. Id., at para. 88.  
104 See Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [2000] S.C.J. 
No. 29, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 703 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Granovsky”]; Hodge, supra, note 72. Another 
decision that frequently is cited in this regard is Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] 
S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gosselin”], though it was not unanimous. 
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In 2008, after a decade of criticism, the Court beat a sort-of-retreat. In 
R. v. Kapp,105 the Court dramatically jettisoned “human dignity” from the 
discrimination analysis.106 Law had never been intended as “a new and 
distinctive test for discrimination”,107 the Court now proclaimed; it had 
merely affirmed Andrews.108 The Court then restated the section 15 test as 
whether a law (a) differentiates on the basis of a prohibited ground; and 
(b) perpetuates disadvantage by way of stereotype or prejudice. 
Because of the way that Kapp was decided,109 the Court did not 
apply the restated equality test to the facts. In subsequent cases, though, 
the Kapp approach proved to be as restrictive as Law. Now, the 
stumbling block was the requirement to prove stereotype or prejudice. 
The Court dismissed claims relating to: the Crown’s management of 
Aboriginal funds leading to lesser returns;110 the diminished decisional 
autonomy accorded to some youths with respect to medical decisions;111 
and a sliding scale of survivor benefits pegged to age.112 In the latter 
case, Withler, the Court appeared to be especially concerned about 
interfering with questions of legislative design.113 It seemed to imply 
that “broad-based plans meant to cover competing interests” of diverse 
                                                                                                             
105 Kapp, supra, note 75. Kapp concerned a one-time 24-hour licence granted to 
members of three Aboriginal bands to fish for salmon in the Fraser River in British Columbia. 
Some (mostly) non-Aboriginal fishers argued that the licence discriminated against them on 
the basis of race.  
106 Id., at para. 20: 
[A]s critics have pointed out, human dignity is an abstract and subjective notion that, 
even with the guidance of the four contextual factors, cannot only become confusing and 
difficult to apply; it has also proven to be an additional burden on equality claimants, ra-
ther than the philosophical enhancement it was intended to be. Criticism has also accrued 
for the way Law has allowed the formalism of some of the Court’s post-Andrews juris-
prudence to resurface in the form of an artificial comparator analysis focussed on treating 
likes alike. 
107 Id., at para. 24.  
108 Law, supra, note 74, at para. 24. 
109 The Court found the program to be protected under s. 15(2) — the approach to which 
Kapp also restated — and, on that basis, held that it was not discriminatory. For a discussion of the 
Court’s approach to s. 15(2), see Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton, “Developments in 
Constitutional Law — The 2010-2011 Term” (2011) 55 S.C.L.R. (2d) 47, at 149-59. 
110 Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, [2009] S.C.J. No. 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222 
(S.C.C.). See the discussion in Carissima Mathen & Michael Plaxton, “Developments in 
Constitutional Law: The 2008-2009 Term” (2009) 48 S.C.L.R. (2d) 71.  
111 C. (A.) v. Manitoba, [2009] S.C.J. No. 30, [2009] S.C.R. 181 (S.C.C.).  
112 Withler, supra, note 76.  
113 Id. 
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groups are not easily classified as discriminatory based solely on 
differential outcomes.114  
Withler dealt with a complex question: the degree to which equality 
analysis requires a “mirror comparator group”.115 The Court decided that 
it does not, but its ultimate prescription was unclear. The Court did not 
eschew comparison, or even comparator groups. Most strikingly, while 
it catalogued criticisms of mirror comparators, the Court never 
questioned earlier cases116 in which the uses of a mirror comparator 
group led to defeat for the claimants. The past decisions were instead 
described as being fully consistent with substantive equality. 
Additionally, while the Court repeatedly invoked the need for a fully 
contextual inquiry, Withler engaged in very little analysis of the 
claimants’ actual situation.117  
Thus, many of the decisions issued in the post-Law period, while 
unanimous, elided difficult questions of equality analysis. Disconcertingly, 
the Court continued to insist that section 15’s chronology was uniform and 
uncomplicated, a single path originating from substantive equality. The 
repeated assertions of a “contextual approach” subsumed quite distinct 
orientations and attitudes within a one-size-fits-all model. The more 
unified the Court appeared, the more shallow its analysis became. 
2. The Decision in A. 
Against the foregoing, the sharp divisions in A. take on a different 
cast. As previously mentioned, the case involved a challenge to the Civil 
Code of Québec,118 which provides access to spousal support and 
property division for married and civil union couples. De facto couples 
have no legal status. The appellant in this case, “A”, cohabited for seven 
years with a man, “B”, and their three children.119 Throughout their 
                                                                                                             
114 Id., at para. 73. 
115 Hodge, supra, note 72, at para. 23. 
116 See Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. 
No. 71, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 657 (S.C.C.); Granovsky, supra, note 104; Hodge, supra, note 72.  
117 Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “Meaningless Mantra: Substantive 
Equality after Withler” (2011) 16 Rev. Const. Stud. 31. 
118 A., supra, note 1.  
119 A and B met, in her native country, when she was 17 and he was 32. B was running a 
large international business which made him extremely wealthy. A accompanied B to Canada and 
did not work during the relationship. At the time of their separation, B was ordered to pay 
A $34,260.24 a month in child support. A., supra, note 1, at paras. 4-7. 
(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE UPSIDE OF DISSENT IN EQUALITY JURISPRUDENCE 129 
relationship, B made it clear that he did not believe in marriage.120 After 
they separated, A was granted child support but since the Code did not 
permit her to seek either spousal support or a share in the family 
property, she launched a Charter challenge. The Quebec Superior Court 
rejected her claim.121 The Court of Appeal partially overturned, finding 
article 585, which deals with spousal support, fatally under-inclusive.122  
In the Supreme Court, LeBel J. provided a detailed history of 
Quebec’s family law regime, in particular its evolution from “community 
of property and separation of property”123 to an equality-based approach. 
In the modern era, he said, marriage is not just a union, but a socio-
economic partnership. It extends, too, beyond formal marriages. In 2002, 
Quebec created the category of “civil unions”.124 Once parties manifest 
their intention to enter into one, civil unions are treated largely similar to 
marriage.125 Those who neither marry nor execute a civil union are 
considered as de facto spouses. Historically, the legislative treatment of 
de facto unions reflected harsh views: such unions were “suspect”, 
“contrary to public order and good morals” and even “immoral”.126 
Beginning in the 1980s, such hostility gradually dissipated,127 but 
Quebec never included them within the family law regime.  
While married and civil union couples are subject to regimes that are 
mandatory in at least some respects, de facto spouses are governed above 
all by freedom of contract. They are “free to shape their relationships as 
they wish, having proper regard for public order”.128 Between 1981 and 
2006, the proportion of Quebec couples in de facto unions increased 
from 7.9 to 34.6 per cent, about double the rate elsewhere in Canada.129 
Against this socio-historical context, LeBel J. turned to section 15. 
First, he affirmed the provision’s preoccupation with substantive equal-
ity, linking the latter to autonomy-based notions of dignity: 
                                                                                                             
120 Id., at para. 5. 
121 Droit de la famille — 091768, [2009] J.Q. no 7153, [2009] R.J.Q. 2070 (Que. S.C.). 
122 Droit de la famille — 102866, [2010] J.Q. no 11091, [2010] R.J.Q. 2259 (Que. C.A.). 
123 A., supra, note 1, at para. 52. 
124 Bill 84, An Act instituting civil unions and establishing new rules of filiation, 2nd Sess., 
36 Leg., Quebec, 2002 (assented to June 8, 2002), S.Q. 2002, c. 6.  
125 A., supra, note 1, at para. 99. 
126 Id., at para. 100. 
127 For example, children’s status no longer depended on the marital status of their parents, 
and agreements between the parties became legally enforceable. Id., at paras. 103-104.  
128 Id., at para. 114. 
129 Id., at para. 125. 
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[Substantive equality] recognizes the dignity of each human being and 
each person’s freedom to develop his body and spirit as he or she 
desires, subject to such limitations as may be justified by the interests 
of the community as a whole. It recognizes that society is based on 
individuals who are different from each other, and that a free and 
democratic society must accommodate and respect these differences.130 
Not only is it “unfair to limit an individual’s full participation in so-
ciety solely because [of] personal characteristics[,] ... it is unacceptable 
to refuse on the basis of these characteristics to treat a person as [some-
one] who deserves to realize his or her full human potential”.131 The 
discrimination analysis must be cognizant of both realities. In particular, 
it is insufficient simply to show legal disadvantage on the basis of an 
enumerated or analogous ground. A prima facie case requires something 
more: a “discriminatory disadvantage” which perpetuates prejudice or 
engages in stereotype.132 
Justice LeBel then offered a detailed analysis of the two concepts, 
beginning with prejudice:  
A legislative distinction based on prejudice denies a class of persons a 
benefit out of animus or contempt. It directly connotes a belief in their 
inferiority, a denial of equal moral status. … It thus treats members of a 
group as loci of intrinsic negative value, rather than intrinsic moral 
worth.133  
Prejudice “is most likely to result in a finding of the types of dis-
crimination to which s. 15 applies”.134 In addition, it “provides a 
framework to enable courts to consider such discrimination without laps-
ing totally into subjectivism”.135 The negative view encompassed by 
prejudice need not be intentional.136 But, it requires more than mere dif-
ferential treatment.137  
                                                                                                             
130 Id., at para. 138 citing Miron, supra, note 71, at para. 145. 
131 Id., at para. 140.  
132 Id., at para. 171.  
133 Id., at para. 195, citing Denise G. Réaume, “Discrimination and Dignity” (2003) 63 La. 
L. Rev. 645, at 679-80 [hereinafter “Réaume”]. 
134 Id., at para. 192.  
135 Id.  
136 Id., at para. 194. 
137 Id. 
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With respect to “stereotype”, LeBel J. focused on the lack of corre-
spondence between the impugned law and the actual needs, merits or 
capacities of the affected individuals. It uses easy generalizations to ex-
traordinarily harmful effect: 
Negative characteristics … which are in fact distributed throughout the 
human race, are falsely attributed predominantly to members of a 
particular group. [These assumptions] can carry forward ancient 
connotations of second class status, even if the legislators did not 
intend that meaning.138  
Stereotype can operate in the absence of actual malice; can co-exist with 
honest beliefs about “natural” differences; and can reflect misguided pa-
ternalistic concern. Nonetheless, the denial of access to benefits or 
opportunities available to others is demeaning139 and, thus, inconsistent 
with equality norms. 
Justice LeBel spoke for four justices. Four others partially joined 
an opinion authored by Abella J., who proposed “a flexible and 
contextual inquiry” that focuses on whether “a distinction has the effect 
of perpetuating arbitrary disadvantage”.140 This, she noted, is consistent 
with McIntyre J.’s decision in Andrews.141 Given that “certain groups 
have been historically discriminated against, and that the perpetuation 
of such discrimination should be curtailed”, it follows that “[i]f the 
state conduct widens the gap between the historically disadvantaged 
group and the rest of society rather than narrowing it, then it is 
discriminatory.”142  
Justice Abella rejected requiring proof of prejudice or stereotype, 
reasoning that because some discrimination involves neither, to focus 
on them would distort the analysis.143 It forces the claimant to prove that 
the impugned law creates negative attitudes, resembling outmoded 
                                                                                                             
138 Id., at para. 202, citing Réaume, supra, note 133, at 681-82.  
139 Id. 
140 A., supra, note 1, at para. 331. As previously stated, Abella J. spoke for five justices with 
respect to the prima facie infringement, but only herself with respect to s. 1. 
141 Id., at para. 322: 
[T]he words “without discrimination” require more than a mere distinction in the 
treatment given to different groups or individuals. Instead, McIntyre J. found that those 
words were a form of qualifier built into s. 15 which limits the distinctions forbidden by 
the section to “those which involve prejudice or disadvantage” (p. 181 (emphasis 
added)). 
142 Id., at para. 332. 
143 Id., citing Sophia Moreau, “R. v. Kapp: New Directions for Section 15” (2008-2009) 40 
Ottawa L. Rev. 283, at 292.  
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understandings of discrimination that required malicious intent. Justice 
LeBel’s approach, she wrote, would impose on claimants “largely 
irrelevant, not to mention ineffable burden[s]”.144  
The distinction between the majority and dissenting opinions is 
rooted in fundamentally different analytics of discrimination. It is, in 
other words, based on principle. It is not surprising that LeBel and Abella JJ. 
reached divergent conclusions about the equality claim. To LeBel J., 
Quebec’s exclusion of de facto couples involved neither prejudice nor 
stereotype. While acknowledging that de facto spouses “were subjected 
to both legislative hostility and social ostracism”,145 he noted that any 
societal disapproval had long since disappeared. The fact that the regime 
privileges the choice to “opt out” of marriage or civil union does not 
make it discriminatory. To the contrary, setting up different frameworks 
for different kinds of relationships “connotes respect for the various 
conceptions of conjugality”.146 Nor should the state be forced to assume 
that conjugality involves mutual obligations until those obligations are 
expressly rejected by the parties to the relationship.147 That would 
undermine the state’s asserted goal of “[enhancing] respect for the 
autonomy and self-determination of unmarried cohabitants”.148 
Justice LeBel employed a similar analysis for stereotype, asking 
whether the legislature was mistaken in assuming that people generally 
exercise autonomous will in their formation of particular family units.149 
Although he accepted that some individuals are unaware of the (lack of) 
consequences of cohabiting without any prior agreement, he answered 
“no”. It would exceed the limits of “legitimate judicial notice”, he said, 
                                                                                                             
144 Id., at para. 330. 
145 Id., at para. 248. 
146 Id., at para. 266. 
147 This was an argument made by Abella J., id., at para. 375, in the context of s. 1, 
specifically, minimal impairment. Justice LeBel responded (id., at paras. 266 and 268): 
[Abella J.] does not recognize the role played by consent in the application of the rights 
and obligations that result from the various forms of conjugality. And it is odd that the 
opt-out solution she proposes for parties living in a de facto union would itself depend on 
this mutuality of consent and would not be available to parties who have chosen other 
forms of conjugal relationships. Next, she fails in practice to consider the social context 
of the de facto union in Quebec. Finally, her analysis would tend to reduce the review of 
alleged infringements of the right to equality to a requirement that adverse distinctions be 
found. There would no longer be an analytical framework to guide the courts in consider-
ing such matters, and this could affect the legitimacy of their decisions in this regard. 
148 Id., at para. 265. 
149 Id., at para. 270. 
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to accept that a Quebec resident who chooses to remain unmarried has 
not made an autonomous decision “to avoid the legal regimes”.150  
Justice Abella’s application of section 15 to the facts was more fo-
cused on the lived impact of exclusion: 
That [the legislative distinction between de facto and other spouses] 
imposes a disadvantage is clear, in my view: the law excludes 
economically vulnerable and dependent de facto spouses from 
protections considered so fundamental to the welfare of vulnerable 
married or civil union spouses that one of those protections is 
presumptive, and the rest are of public order, explicitly overriding the 
couple’s freedom of contract or choice.151 
Despite the amelioration of negative social attitudes towards de facto 
spouses, the law continues to perpetuate negative treatment of them. 
Referring repeatedly to the “functional similarity”152 of de facto and 
other spouses, Abella J. held that the former’s exclusion from the 
statutory regime “perpetuates historic disadvantage” based on marital 
status.153 
Justice Abella also worried that an excessive focus on individual 
choice opened up hazardous avenues of inquiry:  
[A] legal issue of particular importance in this case [is] the proper 
stage in the analysis to address the effect of the choice not to marry. 
In Miron, the fact that marital status is not a real choice was the basis 
for designating marital status as an analogous ground under s. 15(1)… 
Any discussion of the reasonableness of distinctions based on 
this ground, or justifications for such distinctions, must take place 
under s. 1.154 
Citing the need to keep section 15 and section 1 distinct, as well as 
the proper place to consider individual choice, Abella J. refused to accord 
                                                                                                             
150 Id., at paras. 272-274. 
151 Id., at para. 349. While the conclusion regarding s. 15 is only briefly explained, Abella J. 
does spend a fair amount of time on the needs, economic dependency and disadvantage faced by de 
facto spouses on relationship breakdown. Id., at paras. 296-300. She accepts LeBel J.’s “elegant” 
legislative history, but highlights two points: (a) the various stages of law reform uniformly have 
been motivated by the protection of economically vulnerable spouses; and (b) “far from being 
designed to reflect the actual choices made by married spouses, these measures subordinated those 
choices to the agenda of protection” (id., at paras. 305, 307). 
152 Id., at paras. 350-353. 
153 Id., at para. 356. 
154 Id., at paras. 334, 335 (emphasis omitted). 
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any precedential value to Walsh.155 She described the decision as being at 
odds with both Kapp to the extent that it rests on an analysis of “human 
dignity”; and with Withler in its use of the heterogeneity of common law 
couples to conclude that there is no relevant comparison between them 
and married couples in terms of need.156 
Under section 1 Abella J. focused primarily on minimal 
impairment,157 concluding that a “presumptive protective scheme”158 
would provide economically vulnerable spouses with the necessary 
protection, while reasonably safeguarding their partners’ freedom to 
choose.159 Although Quebec had made “a carefully considered policy 
choice”,160 total exclusions of this sort are difficult to justify. Here, 
Abella J. briefly referenced a functionalist argument, acknowledging the 
need for judicial deference when reviewing decisions to allocate scarce 
resources among competing groups or to evaluate complex socio-
scientific research. But neither consideration existed with respect to 
spousal support and property rights.161 Alternative legal mechanisms 
were inadequate.162 Therefore, all of the impugned provisions were 
unconstitutional. 
At this point, Abella J. lost her majority. The Chief Justice joined with 
LeBel J., dismissing the claim in its entirety, while Deschamps, Cromwell 
and Karakatsanis JJ. upheld the provisions related to property division.  
                                                                                                             
155 Walsh, supra, note 72. Space restrictions prevent me from engaging in this further, but 
the relevant passages may be found (id., at paras. 339-347). 
156 A., supra, note 1, at para. 345: 
The importance the Walsh majority placed on the heterogeneity of unmarried relation-
ships resulted from its use of the then operative comparator group analysis. The majority 
assessed the discrimination claim by comparing two groups: married heterosexual cohab-
itants and unmarried heterosexual cohabitants. Although the majority in Walsh found that 
the “functional similarities” between married and common law spouses may be substantial, 
it held that “it would be wrong to ignore the significant heterogeneity that exists within the 
claimant’s comparator group [i.e. unmarried heterosexual cohabitants]” (para. 39).  
In their respective opinions, the Chief Justice and Deschamps J. agreed.  
157 Justice Abella shared the Quebec Court of Appeal’s skepticism about the objective of 
promoting choice in the context of spousal support, because the government already had minimized 
that choice in the case of married or civil union couples. She ultimately determined, though, that the 
issue had not been fully argued. She reached a similar conclusion with respect to rational connection, 
which she found “tenuous”. Id., at paras. 358-359. 
158 Id., at para. 360. 
159 Id.  
160 Id., at para. 363. 
161 Id., at para. 364. 
162 Id., at paras. 365-369. 
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Justice Deschamps reasoned that spousal support and property rights 
fulfil different policy goals. Support provides relief for former spouses 
who are economically disadvantaged. It is not compensatory or contrac-
tual, but need-based. Therefore, the exclusion of de facto spouses was 
unjustified, since such persons “may find themselves in a position of 
vulnerability”163 unrelated to the choice of getting married. The provi-
sions relating to rights of ownership are different.164 They are not focused 
on need, but are intended to “ensure autonomy and fairness for couples 
who have been able to, or wanted to, accumulate property”.165 There is, 
in addition, a “pragmatic” difference between spousal support and prop-
erty rights: living together, and the resulting dependence, often happens 
gradually, while property is acquired by discrete and concrete acts.166 
Thus, a total exclusion of de facto spouses from support was both exces-
sive and disproportionate, but exclusion from the patrimonial provisions 
was justified.167 
The case’s outcome turned on the Chief Justice, whose swing vote is 
reminiscent of the Egan case discussed earlier.168 Chief Justice McLach-
lin agreed with much of Abella J.’s section 15 analysis. In particular, she 
found that while prejudice and stereotype are “useful guides”,169 dis-
crimination requires a contextual analysis. She agreed that the Court was 
not bound by Walsh.170 She argued for a careful separation of section 15 
and section 1.171 She then sounded some different notes. Most notably, 
she was the only justice to anchor discrimination in the views of the 
“reasonable person”: 
[A] reasonable person in A’s position would conclude that in denying 
her recourse to spousal support and equitable property division, the law 
relies on false stereotypes. The law assumes that de facto partners 
choose to forego the protections it offers to married and civil union 
partners. Yet people in A’s situation have not in fact chosen to forego  
 
                                                                                                             
163 Id., at para. 388.  
164 Generally, these are the matrimonial regime, the compensatory allowance, the family 
residence and the family patrimony. Id., at para. 383. 
165 Id., at para. 392. 
166 Id., at para. 393. 
167 Space restrictions prevent me from further discussing Deschamps J.’s s. 1 analysis. 
See id., at paras. 399-408. 
168 Egan, supra, note 71. See also note 97 and surrounding text.  
169 A., supra, note 1, at para. 418.  
170 Id., at para. 422. 
171 Id., at para. 421. 
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the protections of the mandatory regime. A’s real choice was of a 
different nature: she could either remain in a de facto relationship with 
B, or walk away from it ... More broadly, the law rests on the 
assumption that de facto partners will provide for their needs by 
making their own agreements or arrangements for property and 
support. Again, for claimants in A’s situation, this assumption fails to 
accord with the reality of their situation.172 
Under section 1, the Chief Justice described the law’s objective as 
“promot[ing] choice and autonomy for all Quebec spouses with respect 
to property division and support”.173 It became clear that she accepted a 
peculiarly sweeping and maximal version of this goal. It is not just that 
the regime allows for personal choice and autonomy; the scheme posits 
that autonomy must include complete freedom to remain legally 
unattached. Similar to her reasons in Hutterian Brethren,174 the Chief 
Justice cautioned that the criterion of minimal impairment cannot 
undermine or change the law’s purpose (which would occur were the 
law to switch from presumptive non-obligation permitting couples to 
“opt in”, to presumptive obligation requiring couples to “opt out”).175 
Quebec was entitled to pursue this idealized version of choice by 
creating a category of intimate relationships essentially separate from 
the family law regime. 
In A., then the Court split in almost every conceivable way. The 
case primarily diverges on questions of deep principle, but interspersed 
here and there are a few functional concerns. The fact that LeBel J. does 
not have to consider section 1 arguably mutes the debate about the 
propriety of a court upending a powerful and deeply held commitment 
in Quebec society. Chief Justice McLachlin also makes a brief but 
intriguing reference to the need in a federal system to permit regional 
                                                                                                             
172 Id., at para. 428. 
173 Id., at para. 435.  
174 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 
567 (S.C.C.). For further discussion, see Carissima Mathen, “What Religious Freedom Jurisprudence 
Reveals About Equality” (2009) 6:2 J.L. & Equality 163.  
175 A., supra, note 1, at para. 445. Under the final stage of proportionality, the Chief Justice 
accepted that the negative impact on people like A is “significant”. But she concluded that any 
discriminatory effects were attenuated by: the lack of animus or social disapproval of de facto 
spouses; the law’s enhancement of freedom of choice and autonomy; the need to allow legislatures 
“a margin of appreciation on difficult social issues”; and the need in a federal system for regions to 
legislate for their particular populations. Id., paras 449-450. 
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experimentation.176 This is an argument that has been articulated in other 
jurisdictions, notably the U.S.,177 but rarely in Canada. How can such a 
divided decision not be worrisome? Below, I consider this question. 
3. Dissent’s Upside 
A. is a complex decision.178 While I do not contend that the ulti-
mate outcome is necessarily laudable,179 I maintain that A.’s dialogic 
process and analytics are superior to many of (unanimous) cases that 
preceded it.  
First, A. contains specific, detailed articulation of a debate that has 
never been fully resolved: given that Andrews requires more than a 
distinction based on a prohibited ground, what is that “something 
more” that transforms a mere distinction into a discriminatory one? 
What definition of “discrimination” does justice to section 15’s 
underlying purpose? Justice LeBel ties discrimination to classic 
markers of state oppression — prejudice and stereotype — reasoning 
that these criteria motivated the early vision of section 15. This has the 
benefit of setting forth a clear template for future cases. The majority 
rejects this approach as inconsistent with substantive equality. 
Prejudice and stereotype, while important, cannot capture the variety of 
ways in which discrimination manifests. The majority’s approach 
provides space for more diverse understandings of “discrimination”, 
particularly as regards social benefits, but leaves space to justify 
otherwise discriminatory laws under section 1, which at least some of 
the judges proceed to use. 
Second, all of the justices in A. confront the precedent created by 
Walsh. As a matter of stare decisis, Walsh needed to be dealt with on two 
levels: first, as a directly analogous case dealing with property rights for 
                                                                                                             
176 A., supra, note 1, at para. 440, citing P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. 
Supp., vol. 2 (Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2007), at 38-39 and R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring 
Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 209, at para. 275 (S.C.C.). 
177 Hillel Y. Levin, “Resolving Interstate Conflicts over Same-Sex Non-Marriage” (2011) 63 
Fla. L. Rev. 47.  
178 Much of the scholarly reaction to it has been negative. Bruce Ryder et al., Eric v Lola: an 
online roundtable (May 2, 2013), online: Osgoode Institute for Feminist Legal Studies 
<http://ifls.osgoode.yorku.ca/category/thinkingabout/roundtable/eric-lola/page/2/>.  
179 Throughout this article I have refrained from endorsing or critiquing decisions on the 
basis of their ultimate resolution of the equality dispute. This has been intentional, in part because 
the categorization of a decision as “positive” would require its own separate matrix; and in part 
because I accept the content-independent nature of legal authority. 
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unmarried couples; and, second, because it used concepts (human dignity, 
mirror comparison) that appear to have been rejected in subsequent 
jurisprudence. Unlike the Court in Withler, the justices do not simply 
paper over problematic doctrine. They may disagree about Walsh’s utility, 
but they do face the issue. 
Although a majority of sorts does emerge on section 15, A. has 
hardly resolved the key issues. The rejection of proof of prejudice or 
stereotype comes from the narrowest majority. Chief Justice McLachlin’s 
swing vote is especially curious; while she agrees with Abella J.’s rejec-
tion of prejudice and stereotype, her use of the “reasonable person” 
draws on a limiting element of Law-era jurisprudence that is likely to cut 
off future section 15 claims at the prima facie stage. In addition, her will-
ingness to accept totalizing characterizations of legislative goals could 
prove very challenging for claimants. Added to this is the fact that the 
Court is entering a period of profound compositional change.180 Un-
doubtedly, A. will be revisited.  
Yet, for all its infelicities, I contend that A. is a deep rather than shal-
low equality decision, precisely because it recognizes the messiness and 
contingency of equality analysis and does not attempt to mask that with 
easy agreement. 
Against my position it could be argued that it is not obvious why 
“deep” decisions are better than “shallow” ones. Sunstein, for example, 
prefers most constitutional law decisions to be shallow, “incompletely 
theorized” agreements: “concrete judgments backed by unambitious 
reasoning on which people can converge from diverse foundations”.181 
Sunstein is operating in a system with far sharper poles regarding the 
desirability of judicial review per se. He favours “deep” decisions in a 
narrow category of cases, most pointedly, when the issue in dispute 
imperils democracy.182 Such a crabbed approach to judicial review is not 
the norm in Canada and, given the explicit character of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, would be difficult to justify. Sunstein’s aversion to deep 
decisions in equal protection cases likely is also fuelled by the American 
doctrinal limitations of tiered scrutiny which, given the distinctly 
different standards of review for different legal classifications, make 
                                                                                                             
180 Kirk Makin, “Supreme Court justice’s departure puts pressure on PM”, The Globe and 
Mail (April 22, 2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/supreme-court-
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181 Sunstein, supra, note 15, at 20. 
182 Id., at 13. 
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broad pronouncements on equality trickier to produce.183 The lack of 
such internal regulators within section 15 increases the utility and 
desirability of deep principles.  
To be sure, there are times when a shallow decision is preferable, 
such as in cases of empirical uncertainty or when a Court is just starting 
down a particular doctrinal path. The section 7 decisions discussed ear-
lier are examples of this. What is undesirable is the Court portraying 
itself as having resolved foundational conceptual questions it clearly 
has not.  
In the third decade of equality jurisprudence, the conceptual under-
pinnings of section 15 should be clearly articulated and not subsumed 
under vague, one-size-fits-all tests. When unanimity is purchased at the 
price of shallow reasoning, the cost to doctrinal coherence and predict-
ability is greater than the political cost of a divided decision on 
contentious issues. A shallow decision leaves the hard questions unexam-
ined. Consider that both Law and Kapp, two unanimous “restatements” 
of section 15 post-Andrews, did little to assuage uncertainty. The best 
evidence for this is the extent to which those issues needed to be hashed 
out, again, in A. My suspicion is that at a fundamental level the Court has 
never fully agreed on those precepts. If so, such disagreement is better 
acknowledged than masked. In the end, the most significant upside to the 
fractured decision in A. is that it lays bare the essential questions and 
makes clear how much further we have to go. 
                                                                                                             
183 Under U.S. equal protection law, the 14th Amendment has been interpreted to require 
varying levels of judicial scrutiny for legislative distinctions depending on the personal 
characteristics at issue. The levels are divided into “tiers”, commonly referred to as “strict” (applied, 
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